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1. Introduction 
Human capital investment in children (spending on education for example) has attracted 
the interest of many economists (see Becker 1993) as it determines outcomes such as earnings 
later in life. Earnings as well as the level of education are affected by the difference in family 
background (Becker and Tomes 1976). As Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004) point out, intra-household 
resource allocation by parents is equally important. Based on Philippine data, half of the 
difference in completed education is explained by difference within the family. Among factors 
that affect resource allocation of parents are birth order and sex composition of siblings, and 
these are the focus of this paper. Birth order and sex composition affect the intra-household 
resource allocation via parental preferences, difference in prices of human capital investment, 
and/or child endowments. Birth order and sex are among the few endowments of children that 
are easily observable by researchers (Behrman 1988a). Endowments include both genetic and 
environmental factors and due to their effects, are incorporated in modeling human capital 
investment in children (Becker and Tomes 1976, Behrman et al 1982). Behrman and Taubman 
(1986) explicitly treat birth order as an endowment and incorporate it into their model. For 
example, higher birth order children may be associated with lower birth weight as they are born 
to older mothers and thus will have a lower endowment. Further, higher birth order children with 
older sisters may be in better educational environments because their elder sisters take care of 
them. Whether parents make a larger investment in the more endowed (reinforcement strategy) 
or less endowed (compensation strategy) child remains an empirical question. 
Despite extensive study, no strong conclusion has been reached concerning the effect of 
birth order on outcomes of children. One of the biggest obstacles to a firm conclusion is 
endogeneity of fertility. This is a problem in analysis of birth order effects since birth order is the 
realization of parental fertility decisions (Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004). A related problem is the 
difficulty in separating birth order from family size effects. Obviously, higher birth order 
children are from larger families. Higher birth order may be associated with worse outcomes, but 
this may simply be the result of quantity-quality trade-offs (Becker and Lewis 1973). Sources 
that contribute to birth order effects are not clear yet, either. Lower birth order children may be 
better off because mothers with a fixed endowment of time spend more time with them. 
Conversely, higher birth order children may be better off because they face lower financial 
constraints in households where parents face borrowing constraints and increase their earnings 
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during their life cycle. The birth order effect likely depends on environmental factors including 
cultural context. Hence, it is no surprise that previous literature indicates different birth order 
effects across countries. In studying the birth order effect, it is important to take cultural context 
into account.  
This paper is especially concerned with how birth order and sex composition of siblings 
affect parental decision-making on the human capital investment in the Indian context. There are 
many studies that look at the sibling sex composition effect.1 However, these studies do not 
satisfactorily control for endogeneity of fertility.2 Rosenblum (2010), who has studied mortality 
in children as an outcome of human capital investment, addresses the endogeneity problem using 
sex of the first-born child as a proxy for sex composition and family size, but cannot distinguish 
sex composition from family size effects. 
The model in this paper incorporates cultural contexts of India (such as patrilocality, the 
practice of dowries, and low participation of female labor in income-generating activities) into 
the budget constraint. The budget constraint in this model is based on the assumption that sons 
bring future income into the household depending on their human capital while daughters require 
dowry payment from the family. Only with these assumptions, is it possible to derive the 
theoretical implication that boys are better off while girls are worse off with a higher proportion 
of sisters and vice versa with a higher proportion of brothers, given the total number of children 
in the household. Interestingly, the degree of “son preference” does not play a role in deriving 
this result.  
This paper explores birth order and sibling sex composition effects in detail using the 
Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS). Test scores of reading, math, and writing of 
children aged 8-11 are used as a proxy for human capital. It is not uncommon for research of this 
kind to use test scores to measure the level of human capital (Hanushek 1992, Kaestner 1997, 
Iacovou 2007). The possibility of the selection bias problem using test scores is addressed in 
Section 4 and Section 6.4. The test was administered by the enumerators of the IHDS. Three 
                                                          
1 Previous studies on sibling sex composition effects include those of Butcher and Case (1994), Kaestner (1997), and 
Hauser and Kuo (1998) in the US; Parish and Willis (1993) in Taiwan; Garg and Morduch (1998) and Morduch 
(2000) in African countries; Das Gupta (1987), Muhuri and Preston (1991), Pande (2003) and Rosenblum (2010) in 
South Asian countries. 
2 Parish and Willis (1993) do not control for the endogeneity of family size in their main text. They only mention the 
within-family estimates in a footnote and in the appendix. Garg and Morduch (1998) use the number of children 
born alive as an instrument for the number of children and the number of sisters, but the number of children born 
alive obviously depends on parental choice.  
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approaches are used to deal with endogeneity. First, a 2SLS estimation is conducted controlling 
for the number of children. Second, effects of sex composition and household size on outcomes 
are viewed, exploiting the sex of the first-born child. Third, test scores of children within the 
household are examined by controlling for household fixed effects. This may be the strongest 
contribution of this paper to the literature on birth order and sibling sex composition effects 
because unobserved household heterogeneity is completely controlled. Effects by sex and sibling 
composition are also decomposed in order to examine detailed birth order effects. Concretely, 
how the existence of older (or younger) brothers (or sisters) affects the outcomes is examined. 
This decomposition is important since the birth order effect can be derived from a combination 
of cultural factors such as patrilocality, seniority, and so on. The results consistently show that 
boys are worse off when they have more brothers (especially older brothers) but are better off 
with more sisters (especially older sisters). In contrast, there is no strong evidence for birth order 
and sibling sex composition effects for girls when birth order effects are decomposed by sex and 
sibling composition, or household heterogeneity is completely controlled. This is different from 
results found by Das Gupta (1987), Pande (2003), and Rosenblum (2010), all of whom use 
Indian data. The difference may come from the fact that endogeneity of fertility is addressed and 
sex composition effects are distinguished from family size effects in this study. Results of the 
research reported in this paper indicate some possible mechanisms that vary human capital 
investment across birth order: (1) Boys with more older sisters may be more valued as they can 
be the only source of future income at the time of their birth, (2) Parents may invest more in the 
lower birth order boys whose return to human capital investment is higher from the parental 
point of view in the patrilocal society where lower birth order boys are especially relied upon to 
take care of their parents in the future. 
 
2. Background 
Human capital investment in children has been extensively studied since Becker (1993) 
first formalized it into a model. According to the wealth model (Becker and Tomes 1976, Becker 
1991), when parents are wealthy enough to do both human capital investment and bequests, they 
invest in human capital of children until the return to education is equal to the market rate of 
return. This conclusion is the same as in the pure investment model with the perfect capital 
market. It is not applicable, however, when parents are poor or they face credit constraint. 
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Behrman et al (1982) consider the separate earnings and transfer model (SET model) in order to 
analyze the relationship between child endowments and human capital investment. How human 
capital investment in children is related to their endowments is an empirical question. One 
hypothesis is that parents invest their resources in order to maximize returns of the household. In 
this case, the most endowed child will get all the resources (pure investment or reinforcement 
strategy). Another hypothesis is that parents care about the equality of their children and invest 
their resources more in the less endowed child (compensation strategy). 
Behrman and Taubman (1986) extend their SET model and explicitly incorporate the 
birth order effect into it. They treat birth order as an endowment of children that is easily 
observed by researchers. Despite further extensive empirical studies on the birth order effect, 
only a few deal convincingly with endogeneity of fertility (Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004, Black et al 
2005, Conley and Glauber 2006, Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006). Children with more siblings 
are supposed to be worse off because scarce resources are diluted among siblings, and each share 
of the pie becomes smaller (quantity-quality trade-offs; see Becker and Lewis, 1973). However, 
parents who are more concerned with the earning capacity of their children in the future may 
decide to have fewer children. Birth order can be a parental choice as in the case of the number 
of children. In a society with strong “son preference”, parents may decide not to have any more 
children when they have a boy (“son-preferring, differential stopping behavior (SP-DSB);” see 
Jensen, 2005). Alternatively, the last born may be the choice of parents according to the stopping 
rule when they have an abler child. 
Most studies also confound birth order and family size effects. Higher birth order 
children naturally come from a family of larger size. The observed worse outcomes of higher 
birth order children may not be due to their birth order but because they have more siblings 
(quantity-quality trade-offs). Most studies typically include birth order dummies as explanatory 
variables (Behrman and Taubman 1986), and these may simply capture the family size effect. 
There appear to be only four studies that take into account this problem (Ejrnæs and Pörtner 
2004, Black et al 2005, Iacovou 2007, Booth and Kee 2009). There is no study in the context of 
South Asia that separates the birth order from the family size effect.  
Not surprisingly, the mechanism that generates the birth order effect is far from 
conclusive. The difference in intra-household resource allocation among siblings depends on 
child endowments, both genetic and environmental, as well as parental preferences. Parental 
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preference and environmental factors can vary across countries and societies because they are 
dependent on inheritance practices and the level of development (Booth and Kee 2009). There 
are various hypotheses in the literature regarding sources of birth order effects. Those predicting 
a negative effect (higher birth order children have lower outcomes for example) include: (1) 
Higher birth order children are born to older mothers and tend to have lower birth weights, and 
this may lead to lower outcomes in the future (Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004), (2) Time spent by 
mothers for childcare is more diluted for later-born children (Behrman and Taubman 1986, 
Behrman 1988a, Booth and Kee 2009), (3) Later-born children may face more financial 
constraints as parents are running out of funds for education (Behrman and Taubman 1986, 
Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006, Iacovou 2007), (4) Older siblings can increase their intellectual 
ability by teaching their younger siblings (Behrman and Taubman 1986, Behrman 1988a, Blake 
1989), (5) In a society where the eldest child takes responsibility for taking care of his/her 
parents when they become old, they invest more in the eldest child (Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004). 
On the other hand, those predicting a positive effect include: (1) Mothers are better at taking care 
of children as they accumulate experience (Behrman and Taubman 1986, Behrman 1988a, Blake 
1989, Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004), (2) Older siblings take care of younger siblings (Parish and 
Willis 1993, Booth and Kee 2009), (3) Life-cycle predicts that parents increase their earnings 
and can better afford to provide education for later-born children (Behrman 1988a, Parish and 
Willis 1993, Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004, Black et al 2005, Booth and Kee 2009) (4) Lower birth 
order children may be forced to work at a younger age in order to support the family (Parish and 
Willis 1993, Ejrnæs and Pörtner 2004, Booth and Kee 2009) (5) The last-born will do best 
because parents will stop having more children when they have a high-ability child (Ejrnæs and 
Pörtner 2004, Black et al 2005). 
In the Indian context, the difference in human capital investment between sons and 
daughters is often called “son preference”. It may reflect pure parental preference for sons as 
pointed out by Behrman (1988b),3 or it may simply reflect the difference in returns to human 
capital investment between them (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). India is predominantly a 
patrilocal society where sons stay with their parents, and daughters leave their parents after 
                                                          
3 The border between pure “son preference” and returns may be ambiguous, as pointed out by Behrman (1988b). He 
indicates that  pure “son preference” of parents can be explained in terms of returns such that parents gain more 
pleasure from sons than from daughters. He also says, however, that such extreme definition of returns, which 
includes almost everything concerning parental “son preference”, may not be useful. 
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marriage. Sons bring dowries into their family at the time of marriage, while parents have to pay 
dowries when their daughters get married.  Das Gupta (1987) argues that underinvestment in 
daughters is not general across birth order. She shows, based on data in Rural Punjab in India, 
that the burden of excess child mortality falls selectively on higher birth order girls. Consistently 
with the findings of Das Gupta (1987), using a dataset of all of India, Pande (2003) shows that 
higher birth order girls have worse health outcomes. Both of them attribute the negative birth 
order effect for girls to parental preferences for sons. In a society with strong “son preference”, 
girls who are born into households that already have girls are likely to be less valued. Rosenblum 
(2010) has shown that daughters in first-born girl households are worse off while those in the 
first-born boy households are better off. He attributes this to the fact that first-born girls make a 
larger family size (family size effect) and a higher proportion of girls in the household (sex 
composition effect). These results are different from those using data in Taiwan (Parish and 
Willis 1993) and in African countries (Garg and Morduch 1998, Morduch 2000) that show that 
the schooling or nutritional outcome of children is better when they have older sisters. The 
difference in results may be partly due to differences in the cultural context, and this reinforces 
the importance of taking cultural differences into account when birth order effects are studied. It 
may be partly because none of these studies, with the exception of Rosenblum (2010), 
satisfactorily control for endogeneity of fertility. Rosenblum exploits the “natural experiment” 
(sex of the first-born child) in order to exogenously control for the number of children and sex 
composition of the household. However, this method does not distinguish sex composition 
effects from family size effects. 
 
3. Model of Investment in Children with Sibling Sex Composition 
The model of the human capital investment in children used in this paper is a 
modification of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) as well as Rosenblum (2010). The outcome of 
human capital investment in their model is the mortality rate, but the number of households who 
have ever lost a child is limited (about 17 percent of households in the survey of this study). 
Therefore, their model is not general in the context of contemporary India. The basic assumption 
of the model is that parents care about the future welfare of their sons and daughters. The level of 
care between sons and daughters does not have to be equal and can be far apart. Since intra-
household allocation between husband and wife is not an issue in this paper, a single decision 
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maker in the household is assumed. Parents thus unitarily maximize the following utility 
function: 
 
         1 1m m m f f fU c x c H c H       
 
where  c x  is the current consumption of parents, and   ,i ic H i m f  is the future 
consumption of children with the subscript i denoting male or female children. These 
consumption functions satisfy the standard positive, strictly concave, and continuously 
differentiable features ( 0c  , ' 0c  , '' 0c  ). Future child consumption depends on the level of 
human capital, 
iH  which is invested by parents. Though women usually do not work outside the 
household in the Indian context, it seems reasonable to assume that future consumption of 
daughters is determined by their level of human capital due to assortative mating in the marriage 
market (Behrman et al 1995) and the fact that human capital positively affects the bargaining 
position in the conjugal family (Makino 2011). The discount factor, i , is not necessarily equal 
between sons and daughters, and this allows parental pure “son preference” in Indian society. 
Given the number of total children in the household,   is the continuous proportion of male 
children, and  1   is that of female children. Note that while endogeneity of fertility is treated 
in the empirical analysis, it is not endogenized in the model here because the primary concern is 
in birth order and the sibling sex composition effects given the total number of children.4 
Parents face budget constraints given by: 
 
         1 1 2m m f f m fV R H R H x H H           
 
where V  is parent income, which is exogenous in the model, and , ,iR i m f  is the discounted 
contribution of male and female children to family resources. India is predominantly a patrilocal 
society, and sons live with their parents after they marry; thus, sons contribute to their parent’s 
household resources while daughters do not. Earning capacity of sons depends on their level of 
                                                          
4 The model can be easily manipulated in order to endogenize fertility by simply including the number of children 
and attaching it to the proportion of each sex siblings, as is done in the model of Rosenblum (2010). The inclusion 
does not change theoretical implication derived in the partial equilibrium framework.  
8 
 
human capital, mH . This earning function of sons is positive, strictly concave, and continuously 
differentiable ( 0mR  , ' 0mR  , '' 0mR  ).  m mR H  is interpreted to include contributions of 
wives and children. On the other hand, at the time of marriage, daughters leave their parents with 
dowries; thus there is a negative sign in front of their contribution 
fR . Dowries are assumed to 
be non-increasing functions of the human capital of daughters ( 0fR  , ' 0fR  , " 0fR  ). Note 
that this assumption does not exclude the case where dowries are independent of the human 
capital of daughters ( ' 0fR  , " 0fR  ).
5 The price of parental consumption, x  , and the price of 
human capital, iH ,  are normalized to 1. 
Maximizing the parent utility function (1) subject to their budget constraints (2) gives the 
following first order conditions: 
 
   ' ' ' ' 0 3m m m mH c R c c a    
 ' ' ' ' 0 3f f f fH c R c c b        
 
Solving (3a) and (3b) simultaneously yields the demand functions of human capital investment, 
 , , ,m m m fH H V    and  , , ,f f m fH H V   . Plugging these demand functions back into 
the first order conditions (3a) and (3b), and differentiating them with respect to   yields: 
 
     
1
'' '' ' " 1 ' 0 4m m f m f f f f m
H
c H H R R c c R R a


          
 
     
1
'' '' ' '' 1 ' 0 4f m f m f m m m f
H
c H H R R c c R R b


          
 
                                                          
5 It is not yet conclusive whether dowries are prices or bequests. Economists following Becker’s price model (1991) 
have interpreted dowries as prices that clear the marriage market. According to the price model of dowries, human 
capital of brides decreases the amount of dowries while human capital of grooms increases it. Contribution of sons 
 m mR H , which is the increasing function of human capital, can be interpreted to include the dowries they receive 
at the time of marriage. Negative contribution of daughters,  f fR H , is decreasing in human capital. However, 
there is little empirical evidence supporting the price model of dowries (See Zhang and Chan 1999, Brown 2009, 
Makino 2011). Even research supporting the price model shows that only women’s literacy is important in 
determining the amount of dowries, not women’s schooling (Behrman et al 1999). Based on these empirical findings, 
the model does not exclude the case where dowries are bequests and independent of the human capital of daughters 
( ' 0fR  , " 0fR  ). 
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where 
        
2" ' " " ' 2 ' ' " " ' ' " " ' " "1 (1 ) 1 0m m m f f f f m f f f m m mc c R c R c c R c R c R c c R c                
 by the second order condition. The negative sign of (4a) means that, given the total number of 
siblings, a higher proportion of boys decreases the human capital investment in boys. The 
positive sign of (4b) means that a higher proportion of male siblings increases the human capital 
investment in girls. Intuitively, the rationale behind the results above is that when parents have a 
smaller proportion of boys, they have more incentive to invest in them in order to increase the 
contribution of sons to family resources so that they can bear the burden of having a higher 
proportion of girls. One may think that the signs of (4a) and (4b) are indeterminate, but it is 
possible to determine the signs of these terms as above with the following considerations: First, 
when the first order conditions (3a) and (3b) are examined, it is clear that 1 ' 0mR   and 
1 ' 0fR  . Second, a realistic assumption based on the previous literature is that 
m f m fH H R R   . This inequality means that the total cost
6 of human capital of sons is smaller 
than the sum of their total contribution to family resources, the amount of dowries, and the total 
cost of human capital of daughters. This assumption is maintained because human capital 
investment in children even in South Asian countries is more or less associated with its economic 
returns (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, Behrman 1988b, Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). It is also 
because dowries in India are reported to be several times above annual household income 
(Rahman and Rao 2004, Bloch et al 2004, Anderson 2007, Makino 2011) or to share a 
substantial portion of household assets (Rao 1993).7 Note that, based on the previous studies, the 
inequality, 
m f m fH H R R   , holds despite the gender gap in the human capital investment, 
m fH H , in Indian society. 
The above theoretical implication is derived from one single assumption regarding the 
contribution of boys versus girls to households based on being a patrilocal society and the 
custom of dowries. In particular, the above implication is not affected by the level of “son 
preference” that parents have which is captured by the parameter i . For example, even if 
                                                          
6 Remember that the cost of human capital is normalized to 1 in the budget constraint (2).  
7 As an example, Rosenblum (2010) derives the deterministic sign in his model of comparative statics only with the 
assumption of a “sufficiently high” amount of dowries. 
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parents do not care about the welfare of their daughters at all (in this case, 0f  ), the signs of 
equations (2.4) and (2.5) are maintained. 
 
4. Data 
In order to explore the birth order and the sibling sex composition effects, the Indian 
Human Development Survey (IHDS) collected from November 1st 2004 to October 30th 2005 is 
used. The survey covers 41,554 households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods 
across India. The IHDS includes the complete birth history of “eligible women” defined as those 
ever married between the ages 15 and 49. Since the household roster of the IHDS records the 
relationship of each household member to the head of the household (such as wife, son, daughter, 
daughter-in-law, grandchild, nephew, niece, etc.), birth history of wives of heads of households 
can be exactly matched with their children. However, we cannot exactly know, for example, who 
the mother of the head’s nephew is. Therefore the sample for this study is restricted to children 
of the heads of household. Since the interest of this study is in birth order effect, twins are also 
excluded from the sample as is common in the study of birth order effect (Black et al 2007). 
The IHDS reports the test scores of children aged 8 to 11. It consists of reading, math, 
and writing tests, and these are used as a proxy for human capital. The reading test is recorded in 
five discrete variables: cannot read (=0), letter (=1), word (=2), paragraph (=3), and story (=4).8 
The math test is recorded in four discrete variables: cannot count (=0), number (=1), subtraction 
(=2), and division (=3). The writing test is recorded in two discrete variables: cannot write (=0) 
and write with two or less mistakes (=1). Test scores of reading and math are normalized so that 
the highest score is equal to 1. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the normalized test 
scores.9 Boys perform better than girls on all three exams. The difference between outcomes for 
boys and girls in reading and math tests is statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. 
The standard deviation is higher for girls in all three exams, and this implies that human capital 
investment is more diversified among girls. 
Though the test score is just one intermediate aspect of human capital, it is not 
uncommon for research of this topic to use test scores to measure the level of human capital 
                                                          
8 Since these discrete variables are not cardinal but rather ordinal, a robustness check is conducted with the ordered 
logit model. The results are not qualitatively different from the results given by the OLS model (Table 4). 
9 Complementarily, Appendix Table A.1 shows the distribution of the raw test scores.  
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(Hanushek 1992, Kaestner 1997, Iacovou 2007). In fact, there is evidence that early success in 
school leads to greater educational achievement, and the educational achievement of school-age 
children may provide a more direct examination of the sibling sex composition effect (Kaestner 
1997).10 There are some advantages to using the test scores of the IHDS. First, since the test is 
administered by enumerators of the survey, the scores are not subject to recall error or false 
report. Second, the test is taken by children aged 8 to 11 at the time of survey, and the cohort 
effect of children can be eliminated. Controlling for the cohort effect is important in studying the 
birth order effect (Blake 1989). Third, determining how to decide the cut-off age in order to 
extract the level of completed schooling of children is not of concern. Researchers often use the 
level of completed schooling as a measure of human capital investment, and this requires them to 
restrict their sample, such as over the age of 25 (see Black et al 2005), in order to ensure that all 
children have completed their education.11 In doing so, however, it becomes more difficult to get 
a dataset with a complete list of siblings and their completed level of education (Jensen 2005). 
One concern with using the test scores of children in this study may be a selection bias or 
a possible correlation between birth order and whether or not the test was taken. For example, 
suppose that girls are less likely to take the test. Then the girls who took the test may have higher 
unobserved ability than the girls who did not take the test due to the possibility that parents have 
more incentive to let their higher ability children take the test. The unobserved ability may also 
be correlated with birth order. If this selection bias is present, all estimation results are 
misleading. However, there seems to be no serious concern about it, as no evidence can be found 
that birth order or sex of children affect test-taken status.12 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of 8,253 children aged 8 to 11 who took all three 
exams. The average number of children in the household is 3.7. The average age of their mothers 
is 34, and their age at marriage is 17. Only 46 percent of their mothers are literate, and their 
average schooling of mothers is 3.4 years while that of fathers is 5.8 years. Thirty three percent 
of them live in urban areas, and 27 percent live in the villages where the practice of endogamous 
                                                          
10 Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006) suggest that some factors early in life contribute to the first-born premium 
shown in their empirical results.  
11 For an alternative method not requiring the complete years of schooling, see Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004).  
12 See Appendix Table A.6. The estimated coefficients for birth order or sibling sex composition (i.e., number of 
brothers or sisters index) and sex of children are extracted from the estimation models of the birth order and the 
sibling sex composition effects on test-taken status of children, and are presented in Table A.6.  
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marriage is common.13 The village-level variable is included since it is often argued, in the 
Indian context, that the status of women is higher and the socio-economic indicators of mothers 
and children are better in societies where endogamous marriage is common (Dyson and Moore 
1983, Pande 2003, Rahman and Rao 2004). Caste, religion, and state characteristics are also 
controlled in the empirical analysis. 
Table 2 also shows summary statistics by sex of children. The means of the reported 
socio-economic variables are not statistically different between boys and girls at the .05 level of 
significance, except for the number of children and the dummy variable for Sikh. The number of 
children in the household is significantly larger for girls than for boys. This is consistent with the 
idea of “SP-DSB” as argued by Jensen (2005). In a society with strong “son preference”, parents 
may decide not to have children anymore when they have a boy. The “SP-DSB” implies that 
girls are more likely to be from a larger family than boys. This simple evidence underscores the 
importance of taking endogeneity of fertility into account in studying the birth order effect. 
Otherwise, the true family size effect may be interpreted incorrectly as the negative birth order 
effect for girls. Girls are less likely to be from a Sikh family. Sikhs may be more likely to use sex 
selective abortion in order to have an ideal number of boys.14 
 
5. Estimation Strategy 
Studies of birth order effect have to take endogeneity of fertility into account. The birth 
order effect should also not be confused with the family size effect. The 2SLS estimation 
strategy is thus first used in order to deal with endogeneity. The instruments for fertility include 
(1) the village-level accessibility to the clinic that offers several measures of family planning 
services at first birth, (2) the number of brothers and sisters of the father, and (3) the sex of the 
first-born child. Though the sex composition of children is often used as an instrument of fertility 
(see Angrist and Evans 1998), it is not an appropriate instrument in the context of India where 
the sex composition of children is not exogenous. “Missing women” is a well-known 
phenomenon in India (Sen 1990, Anderson and Ray 2010), and the ratio of males to females is 
skewed due to sex-selective abortion, girl infanticide, and higher mortality of girls. However, it 
                                                          
13 The variable of endogamous marriage takes the value 1 if the marriage satisfies one of the following conditions: 
(1) Any member in the mother’s family has been married into the father’s family; (2) The mother is related to the 
father by blood; (3) The mother grew up in the same village/town as the father. 
14 The previous version of Pörtner (2010) confirms this point.  
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can be shown that first-birth has the normal male-female ratio, and thus the sex of the first-born 
is exogenous (Pörtner 2010, Rosenblum 2010). The sex ratio of the first-born in the dataset used 
in this study is also in the normal range and can be considered to be random.15 One may question 
the exogeneity of the availability of village-level family planning services and the number of 
siblings of the father. In addition to the test of over-identifying restrictions, the sensitivity of the 
results is checked by using a different set of instruments in the next section. As for the measures 
concerning the availability of family planning services, five dummy variables are constructed 
taking the value 1 if each of the five contraception methods (oral pills, IUD insertion, male 
sterilization, female sterilization, and injection) was offered by the clinic in the village at the 
time when the mother was first pregnant. Alternatively, the index variable (0-5) summing up all 
the dummy variables is used in place of the five dummies to determine which is the better 
instrument. Table 3 shows the results of the first-stage regression with fertility as a dependent 
variable. The inclusion of five dummies seems to fit slightly better when R-squared values are 
compared. Five dummies are thus included in the main estimation. The use of the index variable 
(0-5) instead of the five dummies does not substantially change the results. In both specifications, 
the problem of a weak instrument is refuted with F-statistics showing the joint significance of the 
instruments. The village-level availability of family planning services at first birth significantly 
reduces the number of children. Also, parents are more likely to have additional children when 
their first-born is a girl, and this is consistent with the idea of “SP-DSB.” 
The birth order effect is separated from the effect of total number of household children 
using the relative birth order proposed by Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004) and also the birth order 
index proposed by Booth and Kee (2009). The relative birth order is constructed as 
   1 1b n  , where b  is the absolute birth order, and n  is the number of children in the family. 
The birth order index is constructed as b A , where b  is the absolute birth order, and A  is the 
average birth order of the family calculated as  1 2n . Both methods generate a variable for 
birth order which is less correlated with family size than the absolute birth order. The correlation 
between the total number of children and the absolute birth order is 0.727, while that between the 
                                                          
15 The sex ratio of the first-born, the second and the third-born, the fourth-born and the higher in the dataset is 1.061, 
1.084, and 1.107, respectively. The sex ratio is calculated for those younger than 12 years old in order to alleviate 
the recall error of mothers, as is pointed out by Pörtner (2010) and Rosenblum (2010). The sex ratio of the first-born 
in the dataset used in this study, 1.061, is considered normal, while the higher sex ratio of higher birth orders is 
consistent with the literature. 
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total number of children and the relative birth order, and the birth order index is 0.127 and 0.181 
respectively. It seems, in this dataset, that the relative birth order is a better measure than the 
birth order index in terms of its relative independence from the total number of children. The 
relative birth order is thus used in the main estimation. Whether or not the use of the birth order 
index instead of the relative birth order affects the results is also checked. 
Since there are only four options for ages of children (i.e., 8-11), dummy variables for 
ages of children instead of actual ages are included in order to completely remove the age effect. 
The results are not substantially different relative to which variable is used. 
Sources of the birth order effect are also important, and these are explored by examining 
the sibling sex composition effect. The index of the number of older (or younger) brothers (or 
sisters) is used in place of the relative birth order. The number of older siblings is sometimes 
used as a measure of birth order (see Morduch 2000 for example), but it is not independent of the 
number of children in the family. Though it is not perfect, the best feasible measure is to treat the 
endogeneity of the number of children and the number of older (or younger) brothers (or sisters) 
with the instruments explained above. The theoretical implication in Sections 3 is that, 
controlling for the number of children, the number of brothers has a negative impact on 
outcomes for boys, while the number of sisters has a positive impact. Conversely, the impact of 
the number of sisters is negative and that of brothers is positive for girls.  
It is also useful to investigate the mechanisms of the birth order effect by looking at, for 
example, birth interval or the existence of elder siblings who have completed their education. If 
maternal time is an important investment in human capital of children, a longer birth interval will 
have a positive effect on human capital investment. Or, if older siblings become an additional 
income source to the household, human capital investment will increase for children who have 
older siblings with higher levels of completed education. The problem of including the birth 
interval and the educational level of siblings aged 18 and older, however, is that these variables 
may also be endogenous. Therefore, they are not included in the main estimation but only 
checked relative to whether or not results change when these variables are included and what the 
coefficients of these variables are.  
Secondly, the estimation conducted by Rosenblum (2010) is replicated and extended. He 
deals with both endogeneity of fertility and sex composition in the household by using a natural 
experiment, specifically the sex of the first-born. His estimation allows assessment of the impact 
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of the sex of the first-born on outcomes (in his case, the number of children or the mortality of 
them) given by the following estimation equation: 
 
 1 2 5ijk j k ijkY FirstBornGirl X State e       
 
where FirstBornGirl  takes the value 1 when the sex of the first-born is a girl, 
jX  includes age 
and sex of the child i  taking the tests and a set of socio-economic characteristics of the 
household j  shown in Table 2, and State  is a set of state dummies. The included age variable is 
not the actual age of children but the dummy variables (ages = 9, 10, or 11 years old) as in the 
estimation above. 
ijkY  is the outcome as measured by test scores of child i  of birth order two or 
higher in household j  in state k . The interest of this study is in the coefficient of FirstBornGirl , 
 . The problem in estimation model (5) is that   captures both the family size effect and the 
sibling sex composition effect. The family size effect predicts a negative sign for  . On the other 
hand, the theoretical implication in Section 3 is that   should be positive for outcomes of boys 
and negative for girls. In order to separate the sibling sex composition effect from the family size 
effect, the estimation model (5) is extended by controlling for the number of children using the 
set of instruments shown in Table 3, except for the sex of the first-born child. 
Finally, family heterogeneity is controlled completely by including household fixed 
effects. This is the strength of this study, since by doing so, the birth order effect can be 
completely separated from the family size effect. Also, any correlation between household 
unobservables that can affect birth order and outcomes, such as test scores, is completely wiped 
out. There are 1,445 households in which more than two children aged 8 to 11 took the exams. 
The estimation equation is given by: 
 
 1 2 6ij i i i j ijY BirthOrder ChildAgeDummies ChildSex Household e        
 
The coefficient of interest is  ; this captures the birth order effect within the household. Since 
the unobserved household characteristics as well as fertility are captured by the household fixed 
effects, in addition to the relative birth order and the birth order index, the absolute birth order is 
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also used in order to check the robustness of the results in the next section. The use of absolute 
birth order enables us to see the economic significance of the birth order effect. 
 
6. Results 
6.1. OLS and 2SLS Estimation for Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition Effects 
Table 4 and Table 5 contain the OLS and 2SLS estimation results of the birth order effect, 
respectively. In the main estimation, relative birth order is used as a measure of birth order since 
it outperforms the birth order index in that it is less correlated with the number of children than 
the birth order index. 2SLS estimation results are reported using the birth order index in the 
Appendix (Table A.2), which essentially shows similar results to those in Table 5. Five dummies 
of the availability of each of the family planning services are used as instruments instead of the 
index variable (0-5) since the use of the five dummies fits better in the first-stage regression. The 
use of the index variable (0-5) does not largely affect the results (Appendix Table A.3). Over-
identifying restrictions are not rejected (Sargan statistics 2.09-3.82 with p=0.80-0.95 depending 
on the test types), which suggests the validity of including all these instruments.16 The 2SLS 
estimation shows that higher birth order girls do better on all the exams than lower birth order 
girls, while there is no birth order effect for boys. The positive birth order effect for girls is 
contrary to what Das Gupta (1987) and Pande (2003) found as evidence for parental pure “son 
preference”. The difference may be because this study takes into account endogeneity of fertility 
and deals with separating birth order and sibling sex composition effects from the family size 
effect. Naturally, older children have a higher score. Boys perform better on all the exams than 
girls. The estimated coefficients of the household socio-economic characteristics show expected 
signs. Children have higher scores when their mothers and fathers have higher education, and 
their mother’s age at marriage is higher. Children from urban areas and from higher castes have 
higher scores. Also, Muslim children have a lower score compared with Hindu children. The 
main difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation results is that the coefficient of the number 
of children becomes insignificant or even positive in the latter. One may argue that it is 
                                                          
16 In addition to the test of over-identifying restrictions, estimation procedures are repeated by dropping one or two 
sets of instruments in order to check the sensitivity of the results to a different set of instruments. These results do 
not alter the main result with the complete sets of instruments, though the significance level decreases when sex of 
the first-born child is dropped (Appendix Table A.4).  
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counterevidence to quantity-quality trade-offs, but given the large standard errors, it is difficult 
to interpret anything meaningful regarding the estimated coefficient of the number of children. 
Although the birth interval and the completed years of education of siblings aged 18 and 
older may be endogenous, how the main results change can be viewed by including these 
variables in order to explore the sources of the birth order effect. The inclusion of these variables 
does not affect the implications given by the main results in Table 5. The coefficient of birth 
interval shows that when the age difference from the immediate older sibling is larger, children 
have higher scores. Also, the completed years of education of siblings aged 18 and older have a 
significantly positive effect on their scores. The former may imply that a mother’s time is an 
important investment in human capital of children. The latter may imply that the older siblings 
become an additional resource to the household for later born children.  
The sibling sex composition effect is explored by decomposing siblings of children into 
older/younger brothers and sisters. Six-by-nine17 different specifications are performed treating 
two endogenous variables (the index of the number of children and the number of older/younger 
sisters/brothers) with the same set of instruments used in 2SLS estimation in Table 5.18 The over-
identifying restrictions are not rejected in all 54 specifications, thus supporting the validity of the 
set of instruments. Relative birth order in Table 5 is replaced by the index of sibling sex 
composition. Other included exogenous variables are the same as in Table 5.  
Estimated coefficients of the index of sibling sex composition (older/younger 
sisters/brothers index) on the test scores are extracted in Table 6. This shows that boys have a 
higher score when they have older sisters. The positive effect of having sisters on outcomes of 
boys is consistent with the theoretical implication. However, having younger sisters has no effect 
on these outcomes, and this may imply that boys who are born to households that already have 
girls are valued more, as parents would count on and invest in them more. On the other hand, 
having older brothers appears to have some negative effects on outcomes for boys. There is no 
significant effect of having older/younger sisters/brothers on outcomes for girls. No sibling sex 
composition effect for girls combined with the higher standard deviation of test scores for girls 
compared to those of boys implies that the variation in human capital in girls mainly comes from 
                                                          
17 Estimation for both sexes/boys only/girls only on each reading, math, and writing test scores are conducted (three 
by three = nine specifications). Sibling sex composition is also decomposed into having sisters, brothers, older 
sisters, older brothers, younger brothers, and younger sisters (six specifications).  
18 2SLS estimations are also performed with one endogenous variable (that is the number of children). The results 
are not qualitatively different from those in the main estimation with two endogenous variables.  
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differences across families. The result of no sibling sex composition effect for girls is different 
from that of Garg and Morduch (1998), which shows that both boys and girls are better off with 
the existence of older sisters. The difference of results in this study may come from the different 
cultural contexts and the fact that more convincing instruments are used in order to treat the 
endogeneity of fertility (remember that they use the number of children born alive as an 
instrument, which is obviously endogenous). The results in Table 6 combined with Table 5 imply 
that while there is a positive birth order effect for girls, it is not derived from sibling sex 
composition. Later born girls are equally better off than earlier born girls when they have older 
brothers and when they have older sisters. 
 
6.2. Replication and Extension of Rosenblum (2010) 
The estimation given by (5) is conducted, and this is essentially a replication of 
Rosenblum (2010). Table 7 extracts the OLS estimation coefficient,  , in the estimation 
equation (5); this is the effect of having a first-born girl on the test scores of children of birth 
order two or higher. Having a first-born girl has a significantly positive effect on the reading test 
for boys and a negative effect on that for girls, and this is consistent with Rosenblum (2010). 
Since the variable “first-born girl” captures both the family size effect and the sex composition 
effect, the OLS estimation used by Rosenblum (2010) cannot differentiate the sex composition 
effect from the family size effect. 
Rosenblum’s empirical analysis is extended by including the number of children treated 
with the set of instruments used in Table 5, except for “first-born girl.” The 2SLS estimation 
result for   is also extracted in Table 7. When the sex composition effect is separated from the 
family size effect, it is clear that “first-born girl” has a larger effect on all the test scores for boys 
and is significantly positive on the reading and math scores. It implies that, given the number of 
children in the household, a higher proportion of girls has a positive effect on outcomes for boys. 
Although sibling sex composition has no significant effect on outcomes for girls, as is consistent 
with the results in Table 6, the estimated coefficients are negative for all the test scores, and the 
magnitude of the effects are larger than that for boys. The large standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients for girls seem consistent with the larger standard deviation of girls’ test scores and 
the previous results implying the large variation in outcomes for girls across families. Note that 
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the number of children has a negative effect on boys’ scores though it is insignificant. This 
shows the importance of separating out the sex composition effect from the family size effect, 
because the family size effect and the sibling sex composition effect are both generated by the 
“first-born girl” and may work in the opposite direction. The significantly negative effect of 
“first-born girl” on the outcomes of girls shown by Rosenblum (2010) and replication in this 
study of his estimation (shown in the first row of Table 7) may be simply the family size effect 
because his estimation confounds both. 
 
6.3. OLS Estimation with Household Fixed Effects 
Finally, household heterogeneity is controlled. The estimation results based on (6) are 
shown in Table 8. Any measure of birth order has a significantly negative coefficient, especially 
for reading and math scores. This means that higher birth order children perform worse on these 
exams. The coefficient of the absolute birth order indicates that increasing birth order by one 
leads to 0.05 point lower scores on all the exams. This is economically significant based on the 
fact that the highest score is normalized to 1, and that the difference in the mean score between 
boys and girls is 0.02 in the reading and the writing tests, and 0.04 in the math test. 
Because the number of observations becomes small when household fixed effects are 
included, and because two children from the same household included in the regression are not 
necessarily the same sex, the estimation cannot be conducted by gender as in previous estimation 
strategies (Section 6.1 and 6.2). Instead, birth order is made to interact with the sex of children in 
order to further explore the birth order and the sibling sex composition effects.19 When the 
interaction term is included, there is some evidence of the negative birth order effect only for 
boys (Table 9). The result shows that the negative birth order effect in Table 8 is mainly derived 
from boys. Looking further into the by-gender birth order effect (Table 10), some evidence can 
be seen for a negative by-gender birth order effect for boys. Also, there is some evidence of a 
positive by-gender birth order effect for girls (see the coefficient of the absolute by-gender birth 
order in the math score). This is consistent with the results shown in Table 5. The math score 
usually includes a significant result when compared with reading or writing scores, and this may 
                                                          
19
 Ozer-Balli and Sørensen (2011) warn against just putting interaction terms into a regression equation without 
considering robustness and implications for the interpretation of results. Results in this study are robust with the 
demeaned interaction terms following their suggestion. Results with the simple interaction terms are thus reported.  
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reflect the fact that math education is more important in Indian society when compared to other 
subjects. The analysis controlling for the household heterogeneity further supports the view that 
higher birth order boys are worse off, especially when they have older brothers. 
 
6.4. Check for Selection Bias 
As mentioned in Section 4, one may question a selection bias in this study, that means the 
possible correlation between child birth order and the status of whether or not they took the 
test.20 For example, if girls are less likely to take the test, then girls who take the test may have 
better unobserved ability than girls who do not take the test. The unobserved ability may be 
correlated with birth order. In order to check whether or not the birth order or the sex of children 
systematically affects the status of test-taken, estimation procedures above are repeated by 
replacing the test score with a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a child took all the tests. 
Selection bias seems not to be a concern in this study as there appears to be no evidence that the 
sex or the birth order of children affects test-taken status (Appendix Table A.6). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Birth order and sibling sex composition effects are explored using test scores reported in 
the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS). The simple model of human capital investment 
in children in the context of India suggests that boys are better off with a higher proportion of 
girls and worse off with a higher proportion of boys, and vice versa for girls, given the total 
number of children in the household. Sibling sex composition effects can exist independently of 
the level of the “son preference” of parents. It can be the result of one single assumption of the 
contribution of boys versus girls to household resources based on patrilocal society and the 
practice of dowries. In accord with the theoretical implication, boys are found to be worse off 
when they are in a family with a higher proportion of boys. In addition, empirical analysis 
consistently shows strong evidence of the negative by-gender birth order effect for boys. Boys 
                                                          
20 It has been suggested that using current enrollment status of children instead of test scores can avoid the problem 
of selection bias because by doing so, all children aged 8-11 can be included. However, the use of current 
enrollment status of children is not useful for the objectives of this study since there seems to be little intra-
household variation in current enrollment status of children (Appendix Table A.5). An exception is evidence of the 
negative by-gender birth order effect for boys, which is consistent with the result shown in Table 10. Estimation 
procedures are repeated by replacing the test score with the enrollment status of children, and coefficient estimates 
of birth order and sex of children are reported in Appendix Table A.5.  
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are worse off when they have older brothers. Higher birth order girls are better off than lower 
birth order girls in the most simple 2SLS estimation. Decomposing the birth order effect into the 
sibling sex composition effect and completely controlling for household heterogeneity, there 
appears to be no strong evidence of birth order and sibling sex composition effects for girls. 
When both results are combined, a possible interpretation is that higher birth order girls are 
equally better off with older brothers and with older sisters. 
Detailed examination of birth order and sibling sex composition effects implies 
mechanisms that derive the birth order effect. Specifically, it suggests the importance of the level 
of contribution to household income. In a patrilocal society, boys can bring income into the 
household, and their wives and children are an additional labor force for the household, while 
girls do not bring income to the household. On the contrary, girls require dowries at the time of 
marriage to take with them. When the proportion of boys in the family is lower, parents have 
more incentives to invest in sons in order to increase the contribution of sons to their family 
resources so that they can bear the burden of having a higher proportion of girls. With a strong 
by-gender birth order effect for boys and of weak birth order and sex composition effects for 
girls, sibling rivalry is seen to be severe among boys while it is not strongly observed among 
girls. Among sons, parents tend to care for the eldest most, perhaps because the eldest son is 
most likely to stay with his parents after marriage and is thus most likely to contribute to the 
parent’s household. Parents may also weigh the eldest son’s role of leading a ritual or family 
ceremony. Other mechanisms deriving the birth order effect include time allocation of mothers 
and additional income sources brought by older siblings.  
Boys are better off with older sisters, but welfare of older sisters is not affected by the 
existence of younger brothers. Boys who are born into households that already have girls may be 
more valued as they can be a scarce source of future income. Older sisters may take care of their 
younger brothers without sacrificing their own welfare. Unlike Das Gupta (1987) and Pande 
(2003), no evidence is found in this study that girls who are born into households that already 
have girls are less preferred or that higher birth order girls are the most deprived among siblings. 
Rather, there is some, though weak, evidence of positive birth order effect for girls. Since the 
endogeneity of fertility is dealt with more accurately in this study than in previous studies, these 
results provide new evidence for the birth order and sibling sex composition effects in India. 
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These results do not necessarily imply that girls are not disadvantaged. The consistently 
higher scores for boys on all exams suggest that the absolute level of human capital investment is 
lower for girls. Besides, the reason why the outcomes for girls are not strongly affected by 
sibling sex composition as predicted by the theoretical model is not answered in this study. 
Further investigating the mechanism of how the patrilocal society, the difference in income 
generating opportunities between males and females, and the practice of dowries generate the 
differences in human capital investment within the household is left for future research.  
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Table 1 
    Summary Statistics of Test Scores for Children Aged 8-11 
 Test Variables mean mean (boys only) mean (girls only) t-test (girl-boy) 
Reading 0.648  0.656  0.638  -2.494 
 
(0.334) (0.329) (0.340) 
 
Number of 
observations 8227 4352 3875 
 
     Math 0.516  0.536  0.495  -5.409 
 
(0.342) (0.338) (0.345) 
 
Number of 
observations 8190 4331 3859 
 
     Writing 0.686  0.696  0.676  -1.906 
 
(0.464) (0.460) (0.468) 
 
Number of 
observations 8158 4305 3853   
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 Test scores are normalized to 1 = the highest score. 
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Table 2      
Summary Statistics (for children aged 8-11 who have taken three tests) 
Variables mean 
number of 
observation 
mean (boys 
only) 
mean (girls 
only) 
t-test (girl-
boy) 
Children's attributes: 
     
Number of children 3.705 8123 3.573 3.852 7.770  
 
(1.626) 
 
(1.620) (1.619) 
 
Child's age 9.468 8123 9.459 9.479 0.833  
 
(1.059) 
 
(1.060) (1.057) 
 
Child's sex (boy =1) 0.528 8123    
 
(0.499) 
    
Socioeconomic characteristics: 
     
Mother's school years 3.432 8097 3.432 3.432 -0.001 
 
(4.376) 
 
(4.417) (4.330) 
 
Mother's literacy 0.458 8118 0.454 0.462 0.737  
 
(0.498) 
 
(0.498) (0.499) 
 
Father's school years 5.830 8099 5.741 5.930 1.768  
 
(4.812) 
 
(4.853) (4.765) 
 
Mother's age 34.078 8120 34.144 34.004 -1.208 
 
(5.192) 
 
(5.243) (5.135) 
 
Mother's age at marriage 16.885 8107 16.923 16.843 -1.013 
 
(3.551) 
 
(3.585) (3.513) 
 
Age difference (Father-Mother) 5.188 8118 5.155 5.224 0.932  
 
(3.352) 
 
(3.290) (3.421) 
 
Urban (yes =1) 0.333 8123 0.326 0.341 1.499  
 
(0.471) 
 
(0.469) (0.474) 
 
Village: Endogamous marriage (yes =1) 0.269 8123 0.266 0.272 1.154  
 
(0.239) 
 
(0.237) (0.241) 
 
Caste variables: 
     
Same caste (yes =1) 0.941 8123 0.944 0.938 -1.010 
 
(0.235) 
 
(0.230) (0.240) 
 
Brahmin (yes =1) 0.051 8123 0.048 0.055 1.563  
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.213) (0.229) 
 
Highcaste (yes =1) 0.139 8123 0.144 0.134 -1.334 
 
(0.346) 
 
(0.351) (0.340) 
 
Scheduled caste (yes =1) 0.234 8123 0.227 0.242 1.602  
 
(0.423) 
 
(0.419) (0.428) 
 
Scheduled tribe (yes =1) 0.076 8123 0.078 0.072 -1.011 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.269) (0.259) 
 
Other backward caste (yes =1) 0.400 8123 0.402 0.398 -0.416 
 
(0.490) 
 
(0.490) (0.489) 
 
Religion variables: 0.786 8123 
   
Hindu (yes =1) (0.410)  
0.784 0.789 0.464  
 
0.145 8123 (0.411) (0.408) 
 
Muslim (yes =1) (0.352)  
0.143 0.147 0.534  
 
0.024 8123 (0.350) (0.354) 
 
Christian (yes =1) (0.152)  
0.023 0.024 0.261  
 
0.026 8123 (0.150) (0.153) 
 
Sikh (yes =1) (0.159)  
0.030 0.022 -2.111 
 
0.007 8123 (0.170) (0.147) 
 
Buddhist (yes =1) (0.085)  
0.007 0.008 0.296  
 
0.012 8123 (0.083) (0.087) 
 
Other religions except for Hindu (yes =1) (0.110)  
0.013 0.011 -0.965 
 
(0.112)   (0.115) (0.104)   
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
      
First Stage Regression  
      
Variables 
Number of 
Children 
Number of 
Children 
Number of 
Sons 
Number of 
Sons 
Number of 
Daughters 
Number of 
Daughters 
Instruments 
      
Village Family Planning Available (Oral pills) -0.0146 
 
-0.0615 
 
0.0388 
 
 
(0.0947) 
 
(0.0712) 
 
(0.0625) 
 
Village Family Planning Available (IUD insertion) 
-0.0124 
 
0.0118 
 
-0.0109 
 
(0.0978) 
 
(0.0694) 
 
(0.0665) 
 
Village Family Planning Available (Male 
sterilization) 
-0.160** 
 
-0.0724 
 
-0.0735 
 
(0.0652) 
 
(0.0555) 
 
(0.0559) 
 
Village Family Planning Available (Female 
sterilization) 
0.0256 
 
0.0331 
 
-0.0146 
 
(0.0736) 
 
(0.0583) 
 
(0.0630) 
 
Village Family Planning Available (Injection) -0.00577 
 
-0.0127 
 
0.00129 
 
 
(0.0536) 
 
(0.0363) 
 
(0.0451) 
 
Village Family Planning Available (Index 0-5) 
 
-0.0339*** 
 
-0.0198*** 
 
-0.0121 
  
(0.00994) 
 
(0.00752) 
 
(0.00791) 
Number of father's sister 0.0141 0.0143 0.00775 0.00753 0.00506 0.00543 
 
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.00719) (0.00723) (0.00795) (0.00794) 
Number of father's brother 0.00384 0.00375 0.00306 0.00309 -0.000295 -0.000423 
 
(0.00951) (0.00954) (0.00655) (0.00655) (0.00726) (0.00727) 
First born girl (=1) 0.329*** 0.327*** -0.811*** -0.812*** 1.149*** 1.148*** 
 
(0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0301) (0.0300) 
       
Observations 7,875 7,875 7,747 7,747 7,755 7,755 
R-squared 0.431 0.431 0.324 0.324 0.354 0.353 
       
F-statistics (test of weak instruments) 14.6 27.7 130.2 251.9 185.9 368.1 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
Other socio-economic variables, caste variables, religion variables, state dummies, and a constant term are included in the RHS as in Table 5.  
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Table 4 
Birth Order Effects on Children's (age 8-11) Test Scores (OLS) 
  Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Socio-economic variables: 
         
Number of children -0.0238*** -0.0225*** -0.0238*** -0.0255*** -0.0255*** -0.0245*** -0.0245*** -0.0280*** -0.0202*** 
 
(0.00338) (0.00469) (0.00447) (0.00333) (0.00460) (0.00434) (0.00493) (0.00670) (0.00651) 
Relative birth order (b-1)/(n-1) 0.0225** 0.00241 0.0469*** -0.00289 -0.00914 0.00474 0.0136 -0.000943 0.0322 
 
(0.0104) (0.0139) (0.0158) (0.0105) (0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0153) (0.0203) (0.0234) 
Child's age =9 0.104*** 0.0881*** 0.123*** 0.0972*** 0.0912*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.0877*** 0.154*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.00931) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0201) (0.0209) 
Child's age =10 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 0.157*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.00928) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.00842) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0190) (0.0192) 
Child's age =11 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.236*** 0.203*** 0.210*** 0.185*** 0.241*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0105) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0214) (0.0221) 
Child's sex (boy  =1) 0.0154**   
0.0370*** 
  
0.0210** 
  
 
(0.00698) 
  
(0.00710) 
  
(0.00995) 
  
Mother's school years 0.00563*** 0.00471** 0.00686*** 0.00769*** 0.00604*** 0.00915*** 0.00636*** 0.00748** 0.00558* 
 
(0.00169) (0.00224) (0.00235) (0.00176) (0.00230) (0.00256) (0.00227) (0.00292) (0.00327) 
Mother's literacy 0.0541*** 0.0435** 0.0682*** 0.0385*** 0.0282 0.0548*** 0.0632*** 0.0388 0.0887*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0145) (0.0190) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0251) (0.0280) 
Father's school years 0.00987*** 0.0114*** 0.00793*** 0.0104*** 0.0122*** 0.00832*** 0.0111*** 0.0127*** 0.00910*** 
 
(0.00101) (0.00136) (0.00143) (0.00102) (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00152) (0.00198) (0.00211) 
Mother's age -0.00112 -0.00395 0.00265 0.00809 0.00440 0.0128 -0.00580 -0.00364 -0.00434 
 
(0.00794) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.00805) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0158) (0.0177) 
Mother's age^2 2.92e-05 6.10e-05 -1.36e-05 -5.51e-05 -2.06e-05 -0.000101 0.000110 9.48e-05 7.47e-05 
 
(0.000110) (0.000147) (0.000161) (0.000111) (0.000146) (0.000160) (0.000162) (0.000216) (0.000245) 
Mother's age at marriage 0.00320** 0.00229 0.00389** 0.00236* 0.00140 0.00332* 0.00303 0.00122 0.00493* 
 
(0.00140) (0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00139) (0.00181) (0.00197) (0.00206) (0.00265) (0.00292) 
Age difference (Father-Mother) 0.00318*** 0.00315* 0.00301** 0.00510*** 0.00305* 0.00698*** 0.00393** 0.00496** 0.00281 
 
(0.00116) (0.00168) (0.00153) (0.00119) (0.00172) (0.00157) (0.00175) (0.00246) (0.00237) 
Urban (yes =1) 0.0439*** 0.0250** 0.0613*** 0.0578*** 0.0399*** 0.0756*** 0.0366*** 0.0190 0.0536*** 
 
(0.00949) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.00974) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0137) (0.0175) (0.0181) 
          
31 
 
Village: Endogamous marriage -0.0379* -0.0344 -0.0419 -0.0286 -0.0232 -0.0338 -0.0467 -0.0692* -0.0230 
 
(0.0199) (0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0199) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0286) (0.0371) (0.0363) 
Caste variables: 
         
Same caste (yes =1) 0.0328** 0.0568** 0.0169 0.0163 0.0302 0.0142 0.0239 0.0441 0.0102 
 
(0.0166) (0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0164) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0312) (0.0324) 
Brahmin (yes =1) 0.0687*** 0.0698** 0.0598* 0.0756*** 0.0767** 0.0684** 0.0322 0.0315 0.0223 
 
(0.0248) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0259) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0363) (0.0473) (0.0477) 
Highcaste (yes =1) 0.0416* 0.0483 0.0336 0.0334 0.0301 0.0365 0.0511 0.0815* 0.0137 
 
(0.0227) (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0232) (0.0303) (0.0311) (0.0327) (0.0421) (0.0430) 
Scheduled caste (yes =1) -0.00716 -0.0114 -0.00570 -0.0315 -0.0358 -0.0301 -0.00424 0.0157 -0.0338 
 
(0.0221) (0.0287) (0.0297) (0.0224) (0.0287) (0.0295) (0.0321) (0.0413) (0.0413) 
Scheduled tribe (yes =1) -0.00286 0.0184 -0.0331 -0.0449* -0.0156 -0.0838** -0.0310 0.0400 -0.120** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0327) (0.0367) (0.0254) (0.0323) (0.0343) (0.0372) (0.0477) (0.0506) 
Other backward caste (yes =1) 0.0186 0.0303 0.00484 0.00665 0.00926 0.00166 0.00862 0.0451 -0.0367 
 
(0.0204) (0.0262) (0.0279) (0.0208) (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0295) (0.0379) (0.0379) 
Religion variables: 
         
Muslim (yes =1) -0.00772 -0.0152 -0.00147 -0.0442** -0.0510** -0.0382* -0.0391 -0.0260 -0.0535 
 
(0.0179) (0.0236) (0.0240) (0.0182) (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0261) (0.0330) (0.0352) 
Christian (yes =1) -0.00454 0.00693 -0.0210 -0.00118 0.0121 -0.0215 -0.0493 -0.0149 -0.105* 
 
(0.0299) (0.0452) (0.0359) (0.0296) (0.0433) (0.0391) (0.0368) (0.0513) (0.0543) 
Sikh (yes =1) -0.00697 0.0292 -0.0531 0.00429 0.0414 -0.0463 0.00350 0.0407 -0.0473 
 
(0.0298) (0.0365) (0.0452) (0.0272) (0.0372) (0.0386) (0.0429) (0.0551) (0.0685) 
Buddhist (yes =1) 0.0294 0.104 -0.0427 0.00440 0.0194 -0.00706 -0.0629 0.0420 -0.140 
 
(0.0453) (0.0699) (0.0613) (0.0379) (0.0611) (0.0493) (0.0626) (0.0954) (0.0966) 
Other religions except for Hindu (yes =1) -0.0325 -0.0593 0.00732 0.00242 -0.00917 0.0286 0.0189 0.00603 0.0541 
 
(0.0412) (0.0520) (0.0537) (0.0404) (0.0431) (0.0586) (0.0618) (0.0675) (0.0864) 
Constant 0.455*** 0.298 0.298 0.325** 0.235 0.151 0.667*** 0.645** 0.691** 
 
(0.143) (0.186) (0.190) (0.138) (0.208) (0.189) (0.209) (0.283) (0.317) 
Observations 7,670 4,029 3,641 7,634 4,009 3,625 7,606 3,985 3,621 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). State dummies and a constant term are included in the 
RHS.  
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Table 5 
Birth Order Effects on Children's (age 8-11) Test Scores (2SLS) 
  Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Socio-economic variables: 
         
Number of children 0.0212 0.0493* 0.0318 0.00176 0.00654 0.0410 0.0474 0.0232 0.0859 
 
(0.0272) (0.0300) (0.0425) (0.0262) (0.0280) (0.0431) (0.0383) (0.0411) (0.0633) 
Relative birth order (b-1)/(n-1) 0.0424*** 0.0304 0.0731*** 0.00869 0.00192 0.0351 0.0453* 0.0199 0.0811** 
 
(0.0160) (0.0187) (0.0252) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0259) (0.0231) (0.0258) (0.0384) 
Child's age =9 0.108*** 0.0935*** 0.131*** 0.0991*** 0.0928*** 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.0879*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.0110) (0.0147) (0.0159) (0.00992) (0.0133) (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0233) 
Child's age =10 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.163*** 0.209*** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.00994) (0.0129) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0233) 
Child's age =11 0.235*** 0.250*** 0.233*** 0.225*** 0.243*** 0.218*** 0.227*** 0.197*** 0.265*** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0125) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0237) (0.0273) 
Child's sex (boy  =1) 0.0265*** 
  
0.0442*** 
  
0.0398*** 
  
 
(0.00993) 
  
(0.00976) 
  
(0.0144) 
  
Mother's school years 0.00859*** 0.00923*** 0.0107*** 0.00985*** 0.00855*** 0.0142*** 0.0113*** 0.0106*** 0.0138** 
 
(0.00253) (0.00300) (0.00409) (0.00244) (0.00282) (0.00429) (0.00342) (0.00378) (0.00602) 
Mother's literacy 0.0459*** 0.0316 0.0567** 0.0310** 0.0216 0.0359 0.0460** 0.0270 0.0608* 
 
(0.0158) (0.0204) (0.0239) (0.0156) (0.0196) (0.0252) (0.0213) (0.0265) (0.0340) 
Father's school years 0.0106*** 0.0128*** 0.00860*** 0.0108*** 0.0127*** 0.00907*** 0.0121*** 0.0136*** 0.00986*** 
 
(0.00111) (0.00156) (0.00150) (0.00112) (0.00152) (0.00146) (0.00166) (0.00224) (0.00223) 
Mother's age -0.00699 -0.0142 -0.00485 0.00474 0.000676 0.000954 -0.0174 -0.0124 -0.0218 
 
(0.00965) (0.0122) (0.0151) (0.00962) (0.0117) (0.0154) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0233) 
Mother's age^2 2.03e-05 5.67e-05 -1.74e-05 -6.42e-05 -3.37e-05 -6.07e-05 0.000125 0.000108 0.000117 
 
(0.000113) (0.000154) (0.000172) (0.000113) (0.000148) (0.000174) (0.000169) (0.000219) (0.000269) 
Mother's age at marriage 0.00761** 0.00889*** 0.00974* 0.00489 0.00424 0.0101** 0.0103** 0.00645 0.0159** 
 
(0.00311) (0.00341) (0.00500) (0.00304) (0.00324) (0.00512) (0.00439) (0.00467) (0.00746) 
Age difference (Father-Mother) 0.00291** 0.00266 0.00254 0.00477*** 0.00260 0.00644*** 0.00358** 0.00514** 0.00181 
 
(0.00119) (0.00179) (0.00157) (0.00120) (0.00173) (0.00162) (0.00179) (0.00252) (0.00250) 
Urban (yes =1) 0.0459*** 0.0253* 0.0680*** 0.0580*** 0.0393*** 0.0822*** 0.0441*** 0.0238 0.0680*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0131) (0.0142) (0.0101) (0.0131) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0180) (0.0208) 
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Village: Endogamous marriage -0.0473** -0.0439* -0.0561** -0.0314 -0.0256 -0.0467* -0.0608** -0.0785** -0.0482 
 
(0.0205) (0.0264) (0.0284) (0.0204) (0.0262) (0.0280) (0.0302) (0.0383) (0.0414) 
Caste variables: 0.0308* 0.0618** 0.00689 0.0154 0.0309 0.00484 0.0255 0.0485 0.00336 
Same caste (yes =1) 0.0308* 0.0618** 0.00689 0.0154 0.0309 0.00484 0.0255 0.0485 0.00336 
 
(0.0169) (0.0248) (0.0230) (0.0166) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0260) (0.0321) (0.0374) 
Brahmin (yes =1) 0.0648** 0.0730** 0.0470 0.0731*** 0.0736** 0.0609* 0.0290 0.0311 0.00879 
 
(0.0256) (0.0360) (0.0336) (0.0267) (0.0353) (0.0363) (0.0377) (0.0484) (0.0502) 
Highcaste (yes =1) 0.0457** 0.0609* 0.0281 0.0336 0.0309 0.0309 0.0522 0.0871** 0.00173 
 
(0.0233) (0.0323) (0.0312) (0.0236) (0.0311) (0.0321) (0.0339) (0.0433) (0.0459) 
Scheduled caste (yes =1) -0.0181 -0.0212 -0.0294 -0.0374 -0.0404 -0.0545 -0.0250 0.00313 -0.0746 
 
(0.0238) (0.0312) (0.0339) (0.0240) (0.0298) (0.0347) (0.0345) (0.0427) (0.0500) 
Scheduled tribe (yes =1) -0.0173 0.00643 -0.0623 -0.0541** -0.0218 -0.116*** -0.0558 0.0250 -0.167*** 
 
(0.0279) (0.0358) (0.0413) (0.0270) (0.0334) (0.0402) (0.0395) (0.0489) (0.0596) 
Other backward caste (yes =1) 0.0155 0.0375 -0.0120 0.00497 0.0134 -0.0152 0.00212 0.0490 -0.0638 
 
(0.0209) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0212) (0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0305) (0.0386) (0.0425) 
Religion variables: 
         
Muslim (yes =1) -0.0495* -0.0808** -0.0540 -0.0666** -0.0795** -0.0949** -0.100** -0.0690 -0.148** 
 
(0.0296) (0.0351) (0.0448) (0.0296) (0.0347) (0.0457) (0.0421) (0.0485) (0.0684) 
Christian (yes =1) -0.0182 -0.0183 -0.0404 -0.0103 -1.55e-05 -0.0423 -0.0735* -0.0285 -0.136** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0488) (0.0386) (0.0318) (0.0470) (0.0420) (0.0413) (0.0563) (0.0593) 
Sikh (yes =1) -0.00478 0.0407 -0.0593 0.00582 0.0460 -0.0506 0.00890 0.0498 -0.0528 
 
(0.0303) (0.0394) (0.0454) (0.0277) (0.0382) (0.0417) (0.0446) (0.0576) (0.0728) 
Buddhist (yes =1) 0.0334 0.124* -0.0458 0.00528 0.0257 -0.0101 -0.0564 0.0592 -0.145 
 
(0.0476) (0.0696) (0.0694) (0.0387) (0.0626) (0.0546) (0.0655) (0.0954) (0.109) 
Other religions except for Hindu (yes =1) -0.0442 -0.0765 -0.0125 0.00233 -0.0140 0.0242 0.00439 -0.0109 0.0428 
 
(0.0452) (0.0642) (0.0528) (0.0418) (0.0461) (0.0578) (0.0638) (0.0724) (0.0830) 
Constant 0.544*** 0.457** 0.503** 0.316** 0.381* 0.241 0.841*** 0.810*** 0.849** 
 
(0.162) (0.197) (0.228) (0.161) (0.213) (0.226) (0.220) (0.292) (0.333) 
Observations 7,540 3,963 3,577 7,504 3,943 3,561 7,477 3,919 3,558 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). State dummies and a constant term are included in the 
RHS.  
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Table 6          
Sibling Sex Composition Effects on Children's Test Scores (2SLS with two endogenous variables = number of children, number of older/younger brothers/sisters index) 
  Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Number of sisters 
index: number of 
sisters/(n-1) 
0.000216 0.0854 -0.0698 0.0470 0.0979* -0.00870 0.0208 0.120 -0.00539 
(0.0434) (0.0532) (0.0605) (0.0431) (0.0567) (0.0602) (0.0646) (0.0790) (0.0894) 
         
Number of brothers 
index: number of 
brothers/(n-1) 
4.06e-05 -0.0811 0.0685 -0.0515 -0.101* 0.0101 -0.0211 -0.126 0.00931 
(0.0444) (0.0543) (0.0613) (0.0441) (0.0579) (0.0612) (0.0660) (0.0811) (0.0909) 
         
Number of older sisters 
index: number of older 
sisters/(n-１） 
0.0122 0.0822* -0.105 0.0543 0.0936** -0.00945 0.0312 0.105 -0.0599 
(0.0451) (0.0439) (0.0924) (0.0453) (0.0477) (0.0910) (0.0673) (0.0651) (0.137) 
         
Number of younger 
sisters index: number of 
younger sisters/(n-1) 
-0.0499 -0.292 -0.108 0.176 -0.223 0.00213 -0.0632 -0.312 0.0628 
(0.196) (0.187) (0.135) (0.199) (0.191) (0.135) (0.286) (0.275) (0.201) 
         
Number of older 
brothers: number of 
older brothers/(n-1) 
-0.00576 -0.104 0.0380 -0.0461 -0.127* 0.00295 -0.0166 -0.149 0.0124 
(0.0380) (0.0682) (0.0381) (0.0378) (0.0717) (0.0381) (0.0564) (0.102) (0.0566) 
         
Number of younger 
brothers: number of 
younger brothers/(n-1) 
0.0376 -0.248 -0.129 0.177 -0.342 -0.0380 0.0384 -0.363 -0.0743 
(0.297) (0.187) (0.118) (0.305) (0.209) (0.118) (0.454) (0.276) (0.173) 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
The table extracts only the estimated coefficients of the measure of sibling sex composition in each of the six-by-nine estimation models. Relative birth order in Table 5 is replaced 
by the index of sibling sex composition. Other included RHS variables are the same as in Table 5.  
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Table 7 
         
Effects of 1st Born Girl on Test Scores of Children of Birth Order 2 or Higher 
  Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
OLS estimation: replication of Rosenblum (2010) 
       
1st born girl 0.00403 0.0250** -0.0195* 0.00283 0.0153 -0.0100 0.00946 0.0222 -0.00541 
 
(0.00848) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.00820) (0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0163) (0.0178) 
2SLS estimation: endogenous variable = number of children 
       
Number of children -0.00631 -0.0548 0.0208 -0.0241 -0.101 0.0526 0.0549 -0.0190 0.0853 
 
(0.0527) (0.0773) (0.0558) (0.0501) (0.0806) (0.0574) (0.0797) (0.114) (0.0835) 
1st born girl 0.00607 0.0360** -0.0314 0.0102 0.0334* -0.0383 -0.00871 0.0260 -0.0495 
 
(0.0189) (0.0173) (0.0309) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0315) (0.0300) (0.0265) (0.0470) 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). In the 2SLS estimation model, the instruments for the 
number of children are the availability of family planning services and the number of father's siblings.  
The table extracts only the estimated coefficients of the 1st born girl and the number of children.  
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Table 8 
         
Children's Test Scores Controlling for HH Heterogeneity 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math Math Math Writing Writing Writing 
Socio-economic variables: 
         
Child's age=9 0.0645*** 0.0828*** 0.0740*** 0.0551*** 0.0611*** 0.0512*** 0.0620** 0.0877*** 0.0819*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0200) (0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0298) 
Child's age=10 0.144*** 0.197*** 0.172*** 0.140*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.150*** 0.221*** 0.204*** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0181) (0.0243) (0.0299) (0.0180) (0.0238) (0.0472) (0.0266) (0.0356) 
Child's age=11 0.148*** 0.222*** 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.191*** 0.153*** 0.129** 0.228*** 0.204*** 
 
(0.0412) (0.0241) (0.0326) (0.0407) (0.0238) (0.0317) (0.0653) (0.0375) (0.0499) 
Child's sex (boy =1) 0.00683 0.00558 0.00521 0.0497*** 0.0457*** 0.0463*** 0.0355* 0.0357* 0.0347* 
 
(0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0186) 
Absolute birth order (b) -0.0656**   
-0.0559** 
  
-0.0642 
  
 
(0.0279) 
  
(0.0273) 
  
(0.0443) 
  
Relative birth order (b-1)/(n-1)  
-0.0265 
  
-0.0860*** 
  
0.0226 
 
  
(0.0313) 
  
(0.0314) 
  
(0.0454) 
 
Birth order index (b/(n+1)/2)   
-0.0868* 
  
-0.152*** 
  
-0.0197 
   
(0.0495) 
  
(0.0484) 
  
(0.0732) 
Constant 0.723*** 0.531*** 0.629*** 0.544*** 0.432*** 0.569*** 0.744*** 0.516*** 0.565*** 
 
(0.0913) (0.0289) (0.0680) (0.0895) (0.0292) (0.0669) (0.145) (0.0425) (0.101) 
          
Observations 2713 2681 2683 2711 2679 2682 2696 2664 2667 
Cluster (household)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The model includes the household fixed effects.  
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Table 9 
      
Children's Test Scores Controlling for HH Heterogeneity and Including Interaction Terms 
Variables Reading Reading Math Math Writing Writing 
Socio-economic variables: 
      
Child's age=9 0.0834*** 0.0745*** 0.0629*** 0.0527*** 0.0889*** 0.0827*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0288) (0.0299) 
Child's age=10 0.198*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.137*** 0.224*** 0.206*** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0243) (0.0180) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0357) 
Child's age=11 0.224*** 0.189*** 0.198*** 0.158*** 0.232*** 0.207*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0238) (0.0317) (0.0377) (0.0502) 
Child's sex (boy =1) 0.0292 0.0458 0.106*** 0.155*** 0.0758** 0.0960 
 
(0.0242) (0.0385) (0.0249) (0.0385) (0.0361) (0.0588) 
Relative birth order (b-1)/(n-1) 0.00231  
-0.0125 
 
0.0714 
 
 
(0.0378) 
 
(0.0394) 
 
(0.0567) 
 
Int(relative birth order*sex) -0.0432  
-0.110*** 
 
-0.0733 
 
 
(0.0358) 
 
(0.0382) 
 
(0.0561) 
 
Birth order index (b/(n+1)/2)  
-0.0623 
 
-0.0862 
 
0.0174 
  
(0.0520) 
 
(0.0525) 
 
(0.0808) 
Int(birth order index*sex)  
-0.0382 
 
-0.102*** 
 
-0.0577 
  
(0.0331) 
 
(0.0339) 
 
(0.0524) 
Constant 0.515*** 0.603*** 0.391*** 0.499*** 0.488*** 0.526*** 
 
(0.0313) (0.0700) (0.0322) (0.0703) (0.0468) (0.108) 
       
Observations 2681 2683 2679 2682 2664 2667 
Cluster (household)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
The model includes the household fixed effects.  
The table does not include the specification with absolute birth order as a measure of birth order. The interaction term between 
the absolute birth order and sex of children is dropped due to the multicolinearity.  
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Table 10 
      
By-gender Birth Order Effect Controlling for HH Heterogeneity 
Variables Reading Reading Math Math Writing Writing 
Socio-economic variables: 
      
Child's age=9 0.0867*** 0.0911*** 0.0757*** 0.0711*** 0.0821*** 0.0879** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0204) (0.0173) (0.0205) (0.0273) (0.0352) 
Child's age=10 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.230*** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0174) (0.0125) (0.0176) (0.0194) (0.0272) 
Child's age=11 0.231*** 0.258*** 0.241*** 0.234*** 0.201*** 0.251*** 
 
(0.0174) (0.0240) (0.0172) (0.0233) (0.0262) (0.0389) 
Child's sex (boy =1) 0.00947 0.0521* 0.103*** 0.0924*** 0.0743* 0.0805* 
 
(0.0257) (0.0272) (0.0260) (0.0268) (0.0394) (0.0429) 
Absolute by-gender birth order (b) -0.00992  
0.0181* 
 
-0.0104 
 
 
(0.0101) 
 
(0.0104) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
Int(absolute by-gender birth order*sex) -0.00299  
-0.0327** 
 
-0.0270 
 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0217) 
 
Relative by-gender birth order (b-1)/(n-1)  
0.0404 
 
0.0303 
 
0.0674 
  
(0.0276) 
 
(0.0302) 
 
(0.0433) 
Int(relative by-gender birth order*sex)  
-0.0359 
 
-0.0546* 
 
-0.0658 
  
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0296) 
 
(0.0455) 
Constant 0.533*** 0.440*** 0.332*** 0.314*** 0.566*** 0.450*** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0284) (0.0237) (0.0290) (0.0373) (0.0437) 
       
Observations 2720 2196 2718 2195 2703 2180 
Cluster (household)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
The model includes the household fixed effects.  
The table does not include the specification with by-gender birth order index as a measure of birth order. The interaction term 
between the by-gender birth order index and sex of children is dropped due to the multicolinearity.  
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Table A.1 
    Distribution of Raw Test Scores for Children Aged 8-11 
 
Test 
Variables   
number of 
observation 
number of 
observation (boys 
only) 
number of 
observation (girls 
only) 
Reading total 8227 4352 3875 
 
cannot read=0 797 378 419 
 
letter=1 1106 578 528 
 
word=2 1644 886 758 
 
paragraph=3 1813 971 842 
 
story=4 2867 1539 1328 
     Math total 8190 4331 3859 
 
cannot count=0 1461 677 784 
 
number=1 2614 1386 1228 
 
subtraction=2 2273 1231 1042 
 
division=3 1842 1037 805 
     Writing total 8158 4305 3853 
 
cannot write=0 2558 1310 1248 
  
write w/ 2 or less 
mistakes=1 5600 2995 2605 
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Table A.2 
Using Birth Order Index instead of Relative Birth Order (2SLS, compare with the fist two rows in Table 5) 
  Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Number of children 0.0191 0.0369 0.0324 -0.00311 -0.00141 0.0409 0.0425 0.0148 0.0871 
 
(0.0268) (0.0276) (0.0462) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0466) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0690) 
Birth order index  (b/(n+1)/2) 0.0482*** 0.0280* 0.0751*** 0.00998 -0.00216 0.0364 0.0426** 0.0177 0.0784** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0246) (0.0142) (0.0170) (0.0249) (0.0213) (0.0240) (0.0381) 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
The table extracts only the estimated coefficients of the number of children and the birth order index. The estimation includes the same RHS variables as in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table A.3 
Including Index Variable (0-5) instead of Five Dummies of Family Planning Services in Instruments (2SLS, compare with the first two rows in Table 5) 
  Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only 
Variables Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Number of children 0.0181 0.0424 0.0238 0.000352 0.00109 0.0419 0.0450 0.0257 0.105 
 
(0.0272) (0.0283) (0.0488) (0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0495) (0.0388) (0.0392) (0.0743) 
Relative birth order (b-1)/(n-1) 0.0479*** 0.0292* 0.0718*** 0.0111 -0.00158 0.0367 0.0433** 0.0201 0.0852** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0170) (0.0251) (0.0143) (0.0171) (0.0255) (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.0398) 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
The table extracts only the estimated coefficients of the number of children and the relative birth order. he estimation includes the same RHS variables as in Table 5. 
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Table A.4 
         
Sensitivity of Birth Order Effects to a Different Set of Instruments (coefficients of relative birth order are extracted) 
  Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only Both sexes Boys only Girls only 
Instruments Reading Reading Reading Math  Math  Math  Writing  Writing  Writing  
Complete 3 sets (coefficient estimates extracted 
from Table 5) 
0.0424*** 0.0304 0.0731*** 0.00869 0.00192 0.0351 0.0453* 0.0199 0.0811** 
(0.0160) (0.0187) (0.0252) (0.0160) (0.0189) (0.0259) (0.0231) (0.0258) (0.0384) 
Only family planning, sex of first born 0.0507*** 0.0301* 0.0780*** 0.0107 1.92e-05 0.0318 0.0473** 0.0194 0.0821** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0255) (0.0142) (0.0170) (0.0251) (0.0213) (0.0241) (0.0393) 
Only sex of first born, number of father's siblings 0.0477*** 0.0296* 0.0772** 0.0157 0.000610 0.0602* 0.0405* 0.0189 0.0988** 
 
(0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0303) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0338) (0.0217) (0.0242) (0.0490) 
Only family planning, number of father's siblings 0.0396 0.00320 0.0680** -0.00997 -0.0404 0.0252 0.0422 -0.0171 0.0595 
 
(0.0266) (0.0358) (0.0309) (0.0253) (0.0365) (0.0313) (0.0390) (0.0497) (0.0465) 
Only sex of first born 0.0434*** 0.0349* 0.0808*** 0.0181 0.0107 0.0516 0.0466* 0.0248 0.103** 
 
(0.0167) (0.0194) (0.0312) (0.0169) (0.0195) (0.0320) (0.0246) (0.0269) (0.0483) 
Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table A.5 
 Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition Effect on Children's Enrollment Status  (coefficient 
estimates of birth order measure and children's sex are extracted) 
Variables Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only 
Compare with Table 5: (N = 9,450) 
  
Relative birth order 0.00963 0.00944 0.00958 
 
(0.00653) (0.00778) (0.0105) 
Children's sex 0.00365 
  
 
(0.00426) 
  
Compare with Table 6: (N = 9,566) 
  
Number of sisters index -0.00728 0.0140 -0.0168 
 
(0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0282) 
Children's sex 0.00734 
  
 
(0.00781) 
  
    
Number of brothers index 0.00760 -0.0209 0.0163 
 
(0.0202) (0.0257) (0.0285) 
Children's sex 0.00758 
  
 
(0.00820) 
  
    
Compare with Table 7: (N = 7,256) 
  
Girl1 -0.00698 0.000720 -0.0110 
 
(0.00839) (0.00795) (0.0135) 
Children's sex 0.00939 
  
 
(0.00766) 
  
Compare with Table 8: (N = 4,028) 
  
Relative birth order -0.0153 
  
 
(0.0101) 
  
Children's sex -0.00175 
  
 
(0.00538) 
  
Compare with Table 9: 
   
Relative birth order -0.00805 
  
 
(0.0126) 
  
Int(relative bo*sex) -0.0111 
  
 
(0.0140) 
  
Children's sex 0.00428 
  
 
(0.00974) 
  
Compare with Table 10: 
   
By-gender relative birth order -0.00869 
  
 
(0.0103) 
  
Int(by-gender relative bo*sex) -0.0195* 
  
 
(0.0114) 
  
Children's sex  0.00313 
  
 
(0.0128) 
  
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%). 
The tables in which these coefficients should be compared are provided.  
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Table A.6 
Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition Effect on Children's Test-Taken Status  (coefficient 
estimates of birth order measure and children's sex are extracted) 
Variables Both Sexes Boys Only Girls Only 
Compare with Table 5: (N = 10,070) 
  
Relative birth order 0.0171 0.00386 0.0462 
 
(0.0217) (0.0249) (0.0345) 
Children's sex 0.00865 
  
 
(0.0120) 
  
Compare with Table 6: (N = 10,189) 
  
Number of sisters index 0.000581 0.0380 -0.0309 
 
(0.0515) (0.0666) (0.0683) 
Children's sex 0.0114 
  
 
(0.0207) 
  
    
Number of brothers index 0.00177 -0.0460 0.0402 
 
(0.0533) (0.0706) (0.0690) 
Children's sex 0.0120 
  
 
(0.0214) 
  
    
Compare with Table 7: (N = 7,754) 
  
Girl1 -0.00864 -0.0142 0.00334 
 
(0.0202) (0.0183) (0.0340) 
Children's sex 0.0173 
  
 
(0.0188) 
  
Compare with Table 8: (N = 4,359) 
  
Relative birth order 0.0397 
  
 
(0.0369) 
  
Children's sex 0.00700 
  
 
(0.0154) 
  
Compare with Table 9: 
   
Relative birth order 0.0314 
  
 
(0.0469) 
  
Int(relative bo*sex) 0.0128 
  
 
(0.0467) 
  
Children's sex 0.000141 
  
 
(0.0290) 
  
Compare with Table 10: 
   
By-gender relative birth order -0.0336 
  
 
(0.0343) 
  
Int(by-gender relative bo*sex) 0.0274 
  
 
(0.0371) 
  
Children's sex  0.0285 
  
 
(0.0323) 
  
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%). 
The tables in which these coefficients should be compared are provided.  
 
 
